CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DELIBERATE INCLUSION
OF NEGRO ON COURT-MARTIAL BOARD HELD
CONSTITUTIONAL

IT IS WELL established that the deliberate exclusion of members of
a particular race from grand or petit juries is unconstitutional under
the equal protection clause.1 In recent years, however, the converse
practice of deliberate inclusion also has been challenged.2 In the
related context of deliberate inclusion of a Negro on a court-martial
board, the Court of Military Appeals has found the procedure constitutionally permissible.
In. United States v. Crawford,3 a Negro enlisted man was specifically chosen to serve on a court-martial board because he was a
member of the defendant's race.4 Asserting that racial criterion is
unrelated to the qualifications of a court-martial board member,5
the defendant on appeal objected to the procedure as a denial of
equal protection.6 In a plurality opinion, 7 the court held that the
1 U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV. See Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964);
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954);
Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Pierre v.
Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
2See Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100, aff'd on rehearing,335 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964). In only one other case, State v. Green, 221 La. 713,
60 So. 2d 208 (1952), was the deliberate inclusion issue squarely met. In that case the
inclusion was considered harmless because it did not specifically limit the number of
Negroes to be chosen. Other cases in which the inclusion issue has been raised have
been decided on non-constitutional grounds. See United States ex rel. Mack v. Walker,
231 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. La. 1964) (systematic inclusion not shown); United States ex rel.
Davis v. Davis, 229 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1964) (systematic inclusion not shown);
State v. Mack, 243 La. 369, 144 So. 2d 363 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 917 (1963)
(systematic inclusion not shown); Brooks v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 555, 342 S.W.2d 439
(1960) (procedural grounds); Haraway v. State, 203 Ark. 913, 159 S.W.2d 733, cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 648 (1942) (procedural grounds).
15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964).
Id. at 35-36.
Brief for Appellant, p. 33. The defendant contended that the procedure employed
was potentially prejudicial because of the "sometimes over-ready complaisance" of
members of his race. Ibid.
1 Brief for Appellant, pp. 32-33. The Government did not argue the merits of
the inclusion issue, contending that the question could not be considered because the
court had originally limited its review to a companion issue, involving the exclusion
of members of lower enlisted grades from the court-martial board. Brief for Appellee,
p. 8 n.l. The court ignored this contention and decided both questions. 15 U.S.C.M.A.
at 40-41.
7The opinion of the court found the procedure of deliberate inclusion permissible
under the federal constitution. 15 U.S.C.M.A. at 34 (Quinn, C.J.). Judge Kilday con-
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defendant's rights had not been abridged as the procedure not only
assured a "representative" board, but discriminated in favor of the
defendant."
Military trials have not traditionally been clothed with the constitutional safeguards applicable to civilian trials,9 but have been
governed by Congress under its constitutional power to regulate
the land and naval forces.' 0 Although Congress has expressly afforded the convening authority broad discretion in the appointment
of court-martial boards," the opinion of the court in Crawford declined to predicate its decision on a distinction between military
and civilian selection procedures.' 2 Instead, a majority of the court
considered the discretion of the appointing officer to be circumcurred on the basis of statutory interpretation, arguing that the Constitution was
inapplicable. Id. at 42. The dissent agreed with the opinion of the court to the
extent that the federal constitution controlled, but found the procedure unconstitutional. Id. at 52 (Ferguson, J.).
8
Id.at41.
9See Reid v. Covert, 354 US. 1, 36-39 (1957); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140
(1953); Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 181, 187 (1962).
It is well-settled that the sixth amendment right to a trial by jury is inapplicable to
courts-martial. See, e.g., Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 (1950); Ex parte
Quiin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942); Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1921). Furthermore,
the fifth amendment expressly excludes from the requirement of indictment by grand
jury1 0 those cases arising in the land and naval forces.
U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8. See Burns v. Wilson, supra note 9; 15 U.S.C.M.A. at
41
(1964) (concurring opinion). The courts have considered Congress better equipped
to balance the demand for military discipline with the necessity for procedural safeguards. See Burns v. Wilson, supra note 9; Warren, supra note 9, at 187. In 1950, Congress enacted comprehensive legislation to regulate military trial procedure embodying
many of the constitutional protections. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 108
(1950), as amended, 70A Stat. 36 (1956), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1958). At that time Congress established the Court of Military Appeals, described by Chief Justice Warren as
a "civilian 'Supreme Court' of the military." Warren, supra note 9, at 188.
11
Selection of court-martial board members is vested in an officer called the convening authority who is authorized to appoint those persons who "in his opinion"
are best qualified for the duty by reason of "age, education, training, experience,
length of service, and judicial temperament." Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C. 825 (d) (2) (1958).
12 Less discretion is inherent in the civilian selection procedure. In the compilation of general venire lists a number of sources may be employed. See, e.g., Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953) (list of taxpayers permissible although it tends to
-exclude more Negro than white jurors); Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565 (1948)
("blue ribbon" jury). Ultimately, however, the names of grand and petit jurors are
generally drawn by lot from either a jury wheel, a box or a book which include the
general venire lists. See generally VANDERBILT, JUDGES AND JURORS: THEIR FUNcrIONS,
QUALFICATIONS AND SELECTION,
JuDicIAL ADMINISTRATION, 162-94

67-71 (1956); VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF
(1949); Comment, 13 HAsrINGs L.J. 479 (1962); 56

MICH. L. REv. 954, 955 (1958). Nonetheless, the discretion afforded in the compilation
of general venire lists may well allow a subtle "packing," thereby affecting the chance
drawing. See Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100, aff'd on rehearing, 335 F.2d 417 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 US. 901 (1964).
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scribed by constitutional principles which have evolved in the selection of civilian jurors. 13
Recent decisions of both the United States Supreme Court 4 and
the Court of Military Appeals' have called for the application of
constitutional guarantees in military trials, however, the extent of
such protection has not been expressly delineated.16 Both courts
have urged the application of "due process" in military trials, 7 but
the Court of Military Appeals has developed a concept of "military
due process," once totally statutory in character,:' which is now said
to emanate from standards enunciated in the Constitution. 19 In
Crawford, the plurality opinion expressly recognized that "constitutional due process" includes the right of a military defendant to be
treated equally with other accused in the selection of triers of fact.2 0
However, the court held that the inclusionary practices were favorI See note 7 supra.
1 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142-43 held that the federal courts on habeas
corpus may consider claims by servicemen that their constitutional rights have been
denied in the military courts, if the latter have failed to consider the constitutional
claim. Justices Douglas and Black, dissenting, were prepared to apply all of the provisions of the fifth amendment to military trials, except for the requirement of grand
jury indictment. Id. at 152-54. Prior to Burns the Court had allowed servicemen
review by habeas corpus only on narrow jurisdictional grounds. Warren, supra note
9, at 187. Chief Justice Warren, who was not a member of the Court at the time of
the Burns decision, has said that the case recognizes that "our citizens in uniform may
not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes,"
and that defendants may challenge deprivations of "fundamental rights" in courtsmartial. Warren, supra note 9, at 188.
25 See, e.g., United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963) (adequate
counsel), 49 VA. L. Rev. 1581, 1585-88; United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29
C.M.R. 244 (1960) (right of confrontation). See Quinn, The United States Court of
Military Appeals and Military Due Process, 35 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 225, 232, 241 (1961).
16 Quinn, supra note 15, at 227-33; see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1957). The
Court did state that a procedure which it approved in Swaim v. United States, 165
U.S. 553 (1897) would have been unconstitutional if double jeopardy protections were
applicable
to courts-martial. 354 U.S. at 36 n.68.
7
2 See United States v. Wilson, 10 U.S.C.MA. 337, 338-39, 27 C.M.R. 411, 412-13
(1959); United States v. Rawdon, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 396, 397, 26 C.M.R. 176, 177 (1958);
United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 77, 1 C.M.R. 74, 77 (1951); Bums v. Wilson,
346 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1953) (dictum).
"I See United States ex rel. Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336 (1922); Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304 (1911); De War v. Hunter, 170 F.2d 993, 997 (10th Cir. 1948);
United States v. Clay, supra note 17; Comment, 64 COLUM. L. Rev. 127, 129-130, 137
(1964).
" See United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.MA. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47
(1960); cf. United States v. Wilson, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 337, 338-39, 27 C.M.R. 411, 412-13
(1959). See Quinn, supra note 15, at 228-32, for a description of military due process.
Chief Judge Quinn of the Court of Military Appeals stated that although military due
process originates from the federal constitution, the concept is broader than civilian
due process. Id. at 232.
20 15 U.S.C.M.A. at 34.
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able to the defendant, and therefore "equal protection of the laws
is not denied, but assured." 21 The court clearly appears to have
incorporated equal protection guarantees into its application of "due
process" protection, whether derived from the fifth amendment
guarantees22 or from the broader concept of "military due process."
The more fundamental constitutional problem of deliberate inclusion raised by Crawford also was scrutinized in Collins v.
Walker, 3 which declared unconstitutional a similar practice in the
selection of civilian jurors. 24 The Collins court reiterated the familiar notion that a Negro stands equal before the law, and "is viewed
by the law as a person, not as a Negro." 25 However, the Crawford
court expressly rejected Collins, intimating that the Fifth Circuit
had failed to perceive a crucial difference between favorable dis26
crimination and prejudicial discrimination.
One requirement imposed by the equal protection cases is that
federal and state classifications must bear a reasonable relationship
to some legitimate governmental purpose; 27 racial classifications in
particular appear to be constitutionally "suspect."-28 Thus, classifications employed to exclude Negroes from jury service consistently
have been held to violate the fourteenth amendment. 29 The Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on the inclusion issues before
the courts in Crawford and Collins, but the logic and language of
21
2 2 Id. at

41.
Although the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment applies only
to state action, the Supreme Court has applied the guarantees embodied therein to
federal action under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Schneider v.
Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Pennsylvania
R.R. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548, 554 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
28 329 F.2d 100, aff'd on rehearing, 335 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
901 2 (1964).
1In Collins, six Negroes were deliberately included in a group of twenty persons
from which twelve grand jurors were drawn. Eleven of the jurors were selected by
lot; the foreman was chosen by the judge. The resulting grand jury of seven whites
and five Negroes returned a true bill against a Negro accused. Id. at 104. Having
failed to include any Negroes on a previous grand jury, the jury commissioners were
motivated in part by a desire to forestall systematic exclusion objections. State v.
'Collins, 242 La. 704, 715-18, 138 So. 2d 546, 551 (1962).
2r 329 F.2d at 105.
2015 U.S.C.M.A. at 41.
2
E.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (segregated schools); Kotch v.
Board of River Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947) (employment opportunity
based on consanguinity); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (right to
maintain
business conditioned on race).
28
E.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, supra note 27, at 499; Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633,
646 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
29 See cases cited note 1 supra.
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its opinion in Cassell v. Texas30 lends support to the proposition
that such a practice violates the requirements of equal protection.
In Cassell the defendant challenged a racial quota system imposed
in the selection of grand jurors.31 While designed to exclude more
than one Negro on any given jury, and in fact challenged on that
ground, in the absence of other exclusionary practices 32 the system
would seem to effectuate as well a deliberate inclusion of one Negro
on most juries. The Court held that the defendant had been denied
equal protection of the laws, stating broadly that "an accused is
entitled to have charges against him considered by a jury in the
selection of which there has been neither inclusion nor exclusion
because of race." 33 The Court stressed that jury members should
be selected on the basis of individual qualifications without regard
34
to their race.
Although Cassell was decided on alternative grounds,35 its emphatic aversion to racial considerations in jury selection seems
applicable to Crawford.3" With similar emphasis, the Court in
Avery v. Georgia37 held that the use of colored tickets designating
the race of prospective jurors was prima facie evidence of unconstitutional discrimination. 33 The Court stated that jury commissioners
130
339 U.S. 282 (1950).
UAlthough no Negroes were actually included on the grand jury in Cassell, the
defendant contended that the commissioners had established a pattern of consistently
limiting Negroes to not more than one for each consecutive grand jury. The defendant claimed that the officials had interpreted past Court decisions as allowing a
practice of deliberate limitation so long as it was approximately proportional to the
number of Negroes eligible for grand jury service. Id. at 286.
32 Other practices might include discriminating against Negroes in compiling jury
lists, e.g., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935), or in selecting jurors from the list.
e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
,11339 U.S. at 287. (Emphasis added.)
31 Id. at 286; id. at 295 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
35 Besides the deliberate exclusionary and inclusionary aspects of the quota system,
the Court pointed to a federal statute which prohibits discrimination in the selection
of grand or petit jurors in any court of the United States or of any state. 18 U.S.C.
§ 243 (1958). The failure of the statute to include courts-martial specifically, and the
separate regulation of military trials in the Military Code of Justice, 10 U.s.c. §§
801-940 (1958) seem to exclude reference to the provisions in military trials.30On rehearing in Collins v. Walker, 335 F.2d 417, 420 (1964), the court held Cassell
determinative of the issue of deliberate inclusion. The court emphasized that in both
Cassell and Collins the fatal defect was the use of race as the basis of selection. The
dissenting judge in Collins sought to distinguish Cassell on grounds that the case
involved deliberate limitation, and argued that the language as to deliberate inclusion
was mere dictum. Id. at 422-23. See also Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6
How. L.J. 30, 54 (1961); Bennett, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1949-1950 Term, 11 LA. L. Rav. 141, 241 (1951); 59 MicH. L. REv. 1054, 1069-70 (1961).
'7 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
"1Id. at 561; id. at 564 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1965: 633

were under a constitutional duty to follow a "course of conduct"
which did not discriminate on racial grounds in the selection of
jurors. 89 In Crawford the court-martial convening authority had
used lists containing names of Negroes marked by asterisks, a procedure similar to that prohibited by Avery. 40 Although the Crawford court distinguished Avery as a case dealing with exclusionary
tactics, Avery's opposition to racial considerations in the process of
issembling juries appears applicable whether the intent is to include
or exclude. 41 Moreover, it hardly seems inapposite to suggest that
the same techniques used for deliberate inclusion of one Negro
could be employed covertly for deliberate exclusion of more than
one Negro.4
The opinion of the court in Crawford formulated a distinction
between prejudicial and non-prejudicial discrimination, tacitly assuming that deliberate inclusion of a member of a defendant's race
is not prejudicial. 43 It appears that the court was employing a
procedural concept to affirm the decision, for an absence of prejudice
is normally sufficient to preclude reversible error.44 But there is
Supreme Court authority to the effect that denial of a federal right
suitably asserted requires reversing a conviction. 4 Thus, even in
the absence of actual prejudice, if it is assumed that a Negro defendant4 has a federal right47 to a court-martial selected without regard
to racial criterion, his conviction arguably should be reversed.
9
Id. at 561.
,0 The officer in Crawford went even further by making a concerted and exhaustive
search for a Negro court member when the lists proved unsatisfactory. 15 U.S.C.M.A.
S

at 36, 59.

'I See Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100, af'd on rehearing,335 F.2d 417, (5th Cir.)
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964); United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. at 58 (dissenting opinion).
'2 There is no evidence that there was a direct effort to limit the number of Negroes
chosen in Crawford. Indeed, another Negro was included on the board, but apparently
not because of his race. See 15 U.S.C.M.A. at 49. Nevertheless, the recognition of deliberate inclusion as a valid practice could well lead to disguised exclusion in other
cases, particularly where the convening authority uses special symbols to designate
Negroes.
"315 U.S.C.M.A. at 51.
"4E.g., Naval v. United States, 278 F.2d 611, 614 (9th Cir. 1960); Bell v. United
States, 251 F.2d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1958); Bartley v. State, 210 Ark. 1061, 1068, 199
S.W.2d 965, 968 (1947); State v. Spears, 76 Wyo. 82, 98, 300 P.2d 551, 557 (1956).
"rNorris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 599 (1935); see Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965); Bruno v. United States, 508 U.S. 287, 294 (1939) (statutory right).
For state cases holding that violation of a constitutional right is never harmless
error see Garcia v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 595, 210 S.W.2d 574 (1948); McCulloch v.
State, 13 So. 2d 829, 194 Miss. 851 (1943); cf. Kotteakes v. United States, 528 U.S.
750, 764-65 (1946).
46A defendant ordinarily has no standing to challenge a discriminatory action on
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Furthermore, the assumption that inclusion here was favorable
discrimination ignores factors which may render the selection detrimental to the accused. White board members may resent the Negro's
presence on the board 8 if they are aware of the deliberate inclusion,
and this resentment may be directed against the Negro defendant.
Likewise, the Negro member who is aware of his deliberate inclusion may be inordinately unsympathetic to the accused in an effort
to demonstrate fairness and objectivity to his appointing superiors. 49
The opinion of the court in Crawford attempted to support the
reasonableness of the classification by stressing that the deliberate
inclusion assured a more "representative" court-martial board. Although the Supreme Court has indicated that federal juries representative of the community are desirable, 50 its holdings that one
may not demand a "mixed" or proportionate jury indicate the absence of a constitutional requirement that specified groups be deliberately included to assure a racially representative jury. 51 The
achievement of "representative" juries may be a legitimate governmental purpose, but deliberate inclusion of members of specified
races is an inappropriate means to that end because racial classification of jurors merely perpetuates the position of a Negro as separate
and distinct before the law.
equal protection grounds unless he is a member of the class discriminated against.

McCabe v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 162 (1914). But see Allen v. State,
110 Ga. App. 56, 137 S.E.2d 711 (1964) (white civil rights worker had standing to

complain of systematic exclusion of Negroes from jury).
,7The opinion of the court stated it was applying "constitutional due process," 15
U.S.C.M.A. at 34, although the concurring judge was applying statutory criteria solely.
Id. at 42.
,8See Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 559, 567 n.33 (1963).

0Cf. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 406, 408 (1959). This was
one argument presented by the defendant in Crawford. See note 5 supra. But Cf.
Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DuKE L.J. 19, 29.
50E.g., Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co.,
328 U.S. 217 (1946).
51 E.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).

